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WHY HISTORY MATTERS IN THE PATENTABLE  
SUBJECT MATTER DEBATE 
Adam Mossoff∗ 
In America’s First Patents,1 Michael Risch proves that nothing beats 
the facts when it comes to making or assessing claims about the history 
of patentable subject matter doctrine. Of course, one might ask why we 
should care about history, especially when justifying or critiquing legal 
rules that secure property rights in twenty-first-century innovation in 
high-tech computers or biotech. It’s a fair question. 
The easy answer is that everyone is doing it. Since the U.S. Supreme 
Court resurrected the moribund doctrine of patentable subject matter,2 
historical arguments abound about whether business methods,3 isolated 
DNA,4 or diagnostic techniques5 count as patentable inventions or 
discoveries, regardless of how novel, useful or nonobvious they may be. 
As Professor Risch points out, scholars and judges are now arguing 
about the meaning of the basic legal rule in patent law, formulated so 
perfectly in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable,”6 and 
historical practices are fundamental to their conclusions.7  
But this is not an entirely convincing answer. Just because Justice 
John Paul Stevens discovers his inner originalist when it comes to 
adjudicating patentable subject matter issues is not a reason by itself for 
others to do the same.8 There are reasons why one should care about 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 1. Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279 (2012). 
 2. The Court first signaled that it was ready to hear arguments about patentable subject 
matter in 2006 when it granted cert in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite Laboratories, 
but then dismissed the writ as being improvidently granted (DIG), see 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006).  
 3. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229, 3231 (2010) (holding business methods 
are patentable, but invaliding the method on hedging risk in a sale of commodities as an attempt 
to patent an abstract idea). 
 4. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that isolated DNA sequences are patentable discoveries), 
cert granted in part U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398).  
 5. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) 
(invalidating a patent on a medical diagnostic technique as an invalid attempt at patenting a law 
of nature). 
 6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 185 (1980) (stating that “[e]xcluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas”). 
 7. There are far too many to cite in a footnote, especially in a short essay, and so a 
representative sample will have to suffice. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239–46 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring), rev’d, 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After 
Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 61 (2011). . 
 8. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239–46 (Stevens, J., concurring) (invoking the Founders, quoting 
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history, though, and Professor Risch’s article nicely articulates them, 
albeit some more explicitly than others. In this short essay, I will briefly 
discuss two of them.  
First, his historical study calls into question many arguments today 
about patentable subject matter doctrine.9 If anything, these arguments 
were the reason why he undertook the herculean task of reading and 
coding approximately 3,700 patents issued between 1790 and 1839.10 
Despite many claims today about long-established historical practices 
concerning what inventions were or were not excluded from the patent 
system, the actual patents that issued to inventors in the first fifty years 
of the American Republic, in Professor Risch’s words, are a “largely 
ignored body of information.”11 
As a result of this study of early patents, many historical arguments 
about patentable subject matter doctrine drop like flies, including 
Justice Stevens’ long-held view that Congress must expressly approve 
of patents for new types of inventions or discoveries12 and the Federal 
Circuit’s claim in Bilski that the machine-or-transformation test is 
rooted in indisputable historical precedent.13 Perhaps most important, 
the historical legal rule that abstract “principles” are not patentable did 
not mean what we think it means (to paraphrase Inigo Montayo).14 
The confusion about the prohibition on abstract “principles,” which 
Professor Risch shows was originally a rule of construction,15 brings us 
to the second reason to care about history: modern legal rules, and the 
institutions that apply them, were formed in an earlier era and thus it 
behooves us to understand the conceptual structure and the normative 
policies that were built into this doctrine. This is a particularly pressing 
concern in patentable subject matter doctrine, because, as Professor 
                                                                                                                     
Thomas Jefferson’s views on patents, quoting Noah Webster’s first American dictionary, and 
detailing early English cases because “[t]he Constitution’s Patent Clause was written against the 
‘backdrop’ of English patent practices . . . .”). 
 9. Risch, supra note 1, at 1282-1285. 
 10. Id. at 1281-82. 
 11. Id. at 1281. 
 12. See Bilski 130 S. Ct. at 3239 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting business method 
patents in part because this will “go beyond what the modern patent ‘statute was enacted to 
protect’”) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 
596 (1978)  (“‘We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the 
position of a litigant who . . . argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of 
public use narrower, than courts had previously thought.’”) (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 216-17 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The broad question whether computer programs should be given 
patent protection involves policy considerations that this Court is not authorized to address.”).  
 13. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring), rev’d, 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 14.  THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 15. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1296–97. 
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Risch reminds us, “[t]he statutory definition of patentable subject matter 
has not changed significantly since 1790.”16 As he makes clear in his 
analysis of the meaning of “principle” in early American patent 
jurisprudence, much confusion in the law can arise when we are not 
properly mindful of our origins.17  
What is most revealing, despite this confusion, is that early 
Americans did not think that the patent system secured only 
“technology” in the narrowest sense of this term, i.e., machines or a 
particular physical transformation of material objects.18 As they did in 
so many other areas of patent law,19 early Americans broke with 
English precedent and permitted the patenting of processes.20 These 
upstart Americans even had the audacity to consider business methods 
to be patentable processes!21 
Professor’s Risch’s discovery of early Americans’ favorable attitude 
toward patenting new forms and types of inventions is consistent with 
my own review of the historical record, in which I found that patents 
were defined by courts as fundamental civil rights securing property 
rights in inventions.22 As such, Congress, the Patent Office, and courts 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 1334. 
 17. Id. at 1300–04. As Professor Risch shows, early American judges were just as 
confused about “principle” as we are today, because they cited to English patent cases, which 
excluded processes as unpatentable “abstract principles.” The American patent system, 
however, permitted patenting of processes, and it was common to refer to patents generally as 
securing the “principle” of an invention. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Beers, 3 F. Cas. 617, 617–18 
(C.C.D. Conn. 1852) (No. 1506) (instructing a jury that “in his specification, the patentee 
explains the principle embodied in his machine, in other words, the novel characteristics or 
inventive elements of the machine”) (emphasis added). These two senses of “principle”—the 
valid sense of the invention and the invalid sense of an abstract idea—are invoked in tandem in 
early American case law, and scholars and judges today have not done enough to ensure that 
they have disentangled them. Cf. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought 
About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
953, 967–85 (2007) (discussing the different senses of “privilege,” as used in historical legal 
documents in patent law, and similarly criticizing patent scholars today for failing to distinguish 
between these different meanings). 
 18. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1327. 
 19. See Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 705 (2007) (discussing 
how American judges extended constitutional protection to patentees against unauthorized uses 
by the government in direct contravention to English patent practice); Adam Mossoff, A Simple 
Conveyance Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L. REV. 707, 713-14 (2009) (discussing 
how American courts secured free alienation rights to patent-owners in direct contravention to 
English patent practice).  
 20. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1297–99. 
 21. See id. at 1294–96, 1320–24. 
 22. See generally Mossoff, supra note 17 (describing how early American patent law 
developed within the political and constitutional atmosphere of the first two hundred years of 
the country’s history, and how patents were defined by courts as civil rights securing property 
rights). 
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treated patents liberally and expansively.23 This was directly contrary to 
the well-established legal rule governing the adjudication of monopoly 
grants, like bridge franchises, which were construed narrowly against 
franchisees in favor of the public given that these monopoly grants were 
deemed to violate common law property rights.24 Professor Risch’s 
study further confirms that the judiciary’s favorable view of patents as 
fundamental civil rights securing property rights in inventions was not 
an anomaly.25 
Of course, there is an important limitation to Professor’s Risch’s 
study of these early patents: what early American inventors thought was 
patentable may not be a reliable source of information about early 
American patent policy. For a significant period of his study (1793–
1836), patent applications were not examined and thus patents issued 
regardless of their validity.26 Many early American inventors had no 
formal schooling or at least they lacked training in the field in which 
they made their innovative discoveries, including many famous 
patentees, such as Samuel Morse, Elias Howe, Jr., Charles Goodyear, 
and Eli Whitney.27 From 1793 to 1836, inventors were left free by the 
registration system to patent whatever their hearts desired, even if they 
were not exactly clear about what they had accomplished or were 
unable to identify it clearly in the patent.28 Moreover, patent attorneys 
were striking out into undiscovered territory in a patent system that 
departed in significant ways from English patent practice.29 This not 
only explains perhaps the confusing and sometimes incoherent patents 
found by Professor Risch,30 it suggests that court opinions concerning 
these patents take on even greater importance, especially as indicators 
of historical patent policy. 
As courts today continue to decide patentable subject matter cases,31 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See id. at 998–1009. 
 24. See id. at 1000–01 (contrasting judicial treatment of property rights secured in patents 
versus the judicial treatment of the monopoly franchise in the famous case of Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)). 
 25. As further evidence of this point, nineteenth-century judges repeatedly and explicitly 
rejected legal claims against patentees based in the “public domain.” See Jordan v. Dobson, 13 
F. Cas. 1092, 1095 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1870) (No. 7519)7,519) (Strong, Circuit Justice); see also 
Mossoff, supra note 17, at 1007–08 (discussing this and other cases). 
 26. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1282. 
 27. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The 
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 175–76 n.66 (2011). 
 28. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1288-91. 
 29. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1287–94. 
 31. See, e.g., SmartGene v. Advanced Biological. Labs., 852 F. Supp. 2d 42, 55 (D.D.C. 
2012) (applying Mayo v. Prometheus to invalidate a patented computer program as an “abstract 
idea”). 
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especially given the recent cert grant in the Myriad Genetics case,32 
judges and scholars will likely be grappling with Professor Risch’s 
findings. But his study speaks more broadly about the patent system, 
too. It cautions us against assuming that the American patent system 
was born like Athena fully formed and complete from the English 
system whence it came. The commonplace adage that “[t]he 
Constitution’s Patent Clause was written against the ‘backdrop’ of 
English patent practices”33 obscures more than it illuminates the many 
ways that early American patent law diverged from its English 
predecessor. That these early American patent rules and institutions 
continue to exist today makes it even more important that we 
understand properly how and why they came to be. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 32. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that isolated DNA sequences are patentable discoveries), 
cert granted in part U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
 33. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
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